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Abstract
Judge Christian Byk renders service to the Steering
Committee on Bioethics of the Council ofEurope
(CDBI) by proposing a draft of the protocol destined
to fill in a gap in international law on the status of the
human embryo. This proposal, printed in a previous
issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics' deserves
nevertheless to be questioned on important points. Is
Christian Byk proposing to legalise research on
human embryos not only in vitro but also in utero?
Keywords: European Convention on Biomedicine; em-
bryo research; status of the human embryo; artificial
procreation
Resume
J7uge Christian Byk rend service aux Comite' directeur
sur la biomedicine du Conseil de l'Europe (CDBI) en
proposant une esquisse de protocole, destinee a remplir
le vide juridique relatif au statut de l'embryon
humain. Cette esquisse, imprime dans le Journal of
Medical Ethics,' merite quelque commentaires cri-
tiques. Est-ce que Monsieur Byk propose de legaliser la
recherche sur les embryons humains, non seulement in
vitro, mais aussi in utero?
(Journal ofMedical Ethics 1998;24:345-347)
Mots-cles: Convention Europeenne de Biomedicine;
recherche sur l'embryon; statut de 1'embryon humain; pro-
creation artificielle
Introduction
The legal status of the human embryo has been
discussed but not clarified. Since the Warnock
committee refused to define it in 1984, it has been
considered politically correct to refrain from any
attempt to do so. There may be good reasons for
such failure to confront and tackle difficult political
problems when they concern ethics. However, the
practice of artificial procreation, and related
techniques such as freezing and experimenting with
embryos, create such acute moral problems that an
evaluation in the light of a coherent view of the
staus of the human embryo seems indispensable.
If the proposed draft protocol is intended to
define the status of the human embryo, one is left
perplexed. The foreword makes it clear, that
Christian Byk "is simply making the following
suggestion: let us put aside the controversy about
the legal nature of the embryo and let us suppose
the the embryo could be regarded as - I do not say
is - a vulnerable person".2 The proposed protocol
thus pretends to clarify not what the human
embryo is, but what it could be regarded as - given
the political circumstances.
While this approach may be, to some extent,
legitimate it is hardly satisfactory from a philo-
sophical standpoint. It is, nevertheless, correct, as
Christan Byk remarks, that "we urgently need
reasonable and well-orientated public debate on
the convention".
The following must be considered a contribu-
tion to this debate.
Comments
The draft protocol contains nine articles in three
sections.
Of the nine articles six are protective of the vul-
nerable person the embryo could be said to be.
The three remaining concern exceptions to the
application of this protection.
Section 1: object and general remarks
(articles 1 - 3)
The reader of the draft protocol is struck by the
double application of the protocol. It is not only
intended to regulate research on human embryos
in vitro, but it also intends to regulate research on
human fetuses in utero. Now, it must be presumed
that this double application responds to a political
demand, and it would not present any major diffi-
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culties if the draft protocol was merely protective.
But as it stands, it is sad that the permissiveness
relating to embryos concieved in vitro will erode
the protection of embryos and fetuses conceived
in utero.
Research on human embryos and fetuses in
utero is established as a recognised practice,
whereas it ought to be - not only for the sake of the
embryo or fetus, but first and foremost for the
sake of the woman's health and psychological bal-
ance - banned.
Section 2: embryo and fetus in utero
(articles four - five)
Article four of the proposed draft is a fine example
of the kind of legal protection the embryo or fetus
conceived in utero requires:
"Article four: During pregnancy, a woman cannot
take part in medical research from which her health
and/or the health of the embryo would not benefit
in some direct way. When the anticipated benefit
exists only for the woman, the embryo or fetus must
only incur the minimum degree of risk connected
with this research. Furthermore, the embryo and
the fetus in utero cannot be the object of research
unless the aim of the research is to ensure their
development and if they incur only the minimum
degree of risk connected with this research."
This article actually excludes non-therapeutic and
destructive research and it ensures the application
of the principle of minimal risk to the embryo or
fetus when the primary research object is its
mother. Good paragraphs, but deceptive when
complemented by article five:
"Article five: However, research with no direct
benefit for the embryo or the fetus can be carried
out if:
a) its therapeutic, diagnostic or cognitive outcome
can be of benefit to other embryos or fetuses that
are in this period of life; b) the same scientific
results cannot be obtained by other means; c) the
embryo or fetus only incurs a minimal risk; d) an
independent committee has given its opinion on
the research project and the existence of a possible
conflict of interests between the woman and the
embryo or the fetus; e) should there be a conflict,
an "ad hoc" representative of the embryo or fetus
has been appointed by the legal authority."
In the case where national legislation prescribes
the destruction of the embryo subject of experi-
ences where it has been genetically modified or
where a serious risk to its healthy development can
be presumed,3 all research, no matter its objective,
will be indirectly detrimental to the embryo.
The notion of "therapeutic research" is applied
to mean therapy for embryos other than the ones
used for experiments (which are then conse-
quently destroyed). This use of the notion of
"therapeutic research" undermines the respect for
the individual that our societies in the West have
fostered so carefully during more than 2000 years.
The notion therefore needs clarification.
Section 3: embryos in vitro (articles six -
nine)
The section on the embryo conceived in vitro
likewise presents two fine and perceptive para-
graphs protecting the human embryo conceived in
vitro:
"Article six: No embryo should be procreated in
vitro for the sole ends of research. ... Article seven:
Research on a pre-implantation embryo (in vitro)
should only be permitted if this research could
directly benefit the embryo, in the context of its
implantation in the uterus of the woman, its later
development or its state of health. The embryo
should incur only the minimum degree of risk
connected with this research...."
But two conditional prohibitions on cryo-
preservation and germ-line cell therapy leave it up
to the national authorities - whether this function
is secured by the law, as in France, or by an inde-
pendent authority, as in England - to decide
whether embryos could be cryopreserved with a
view to research and whether research on germ-
line cell therapy could be carried out.
Moreover, article eight creates more exceptions:
"Article eight: Exceptionally, research with no
direct benefit may be carried out on a pre-
implantation embryo:
a) if it is not likely to be detrimental to it and if it
respects the conclusions set out in a), b), d) and e)
of article five, or b) if its object is to diagnose a
particularly serious disorder recognised as incur-
able."
Again: in the case of national legislation prescrib-
ing destruction of embryos used for research,
there is no way research could be non-detrimental
to the embryos.
As to the fate of the "spare" embryos, the
following provisions are proposed:
"Article nine: Research on an in vitro embryo
which cannot be implanted can only be carried
out if:
a) the outcome of the research is the development
of techniques of medically assisted procreation or
antenatal diagnosis as well as the improvement of
 group.bmj.com on March 5, 2012 - Published by jme.bmj.comDownloaded from 
Lebech 347
knowledge in the field of pathologies that are par-
ticularly serious both for humanity and in the field
of embryo-genesis; b) the research is not carried
out beyond the 14th day of development; c) the
research has been subjected to a scientific and
ethical assesment by an independent committee."
Legalising all research on "spare" embryos for the
purposes of improving assisted reproduction
techniques or antenatal diagnosis, is equal to rec-
ognising the subordination of human life to the
eugenic project. Many are the voices which have
condemned or warned against this vast, problem-
atic project. It is time these condemnations and
warnings were faced.
Suggestions and conclusion
The following comments sum up the criticisms
made in the preceding paragraphs.
It is impossible to accept the proposal for a pro-
tocol as it stands. A separation of research on
human embryos and fetuses in utero and human
embryos in vitro seems necessary, because of the
different situation of the embryos or fetuses in
question. The social consequences of widespread
reseach on human fetuses in utero are almost
unthinkable and, without the slightest doubt,
undesirable. It will be necessary to think of the
psychological and spiritual damage to the mother
as well as of the planned and exploited physical
destruction of the child. Therefore it seems best to
treat the questions separately.
Concerning research on embryos in vitro, the
notion of therapeutic research needs to be clarified,
bearing in mind that it is hardly possible to desig-
nate research for the benefit of others as therapeu-
tic research. Especially not if national legislation
prescribes the destruction of embryos having
served as research subjects.
Last, but not least: what we were waiting for was
not a protocol relating to research on the human
embryo and fetus. It was a protocol on the legal
status of the human embryo. We are still in want of
that.
Mette Maria Lebech is Jrunior Researcher at the Cen-
trefor Ethics and Law, University ofCopenhagen, and
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